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To evacuate or not to evacuate? That is the question.

February 01, 2017

With over 150 hoax bomb threats reported, you should have already have a plan. However, the ongoing threats should serve as a reminder to review our ongoing guidance, make use of the resources and implement the recommendations, as appropriate.

Should we be worried? At this time the experts conclude that the series of
incidents referencing threats against schools, Jewish facilities and businesses likely do not represent a credible terrorist threat for two reasons:

  1. terrorists’ rarely provide operational insight into their planning, and
  2. the fact that nearly all hoaxes in the United States are conducted by criminal actors or those instigating a nuisance prank.
From “Bomb Threat Guidance” from US DHS and the FBI. Click on the image to download the brochure.

What are my options? Many security experts question the wisdom of the policy of evacuation. After all, a terrorist could trigger an evacuation of a facility with a simple phone call and then attack the evacuees in multiple ways. On the other hand, someone could place 100 hoax bomb threat calls, but actually plant a bomb on the 101st. (In rebuttal, why make a warning phone call when simply planting the bomb works).

The bottom line is that there is no perfect solution, so all institutions should think about their options and consult with local law enforcement in the absence of the pressure of an actual emergency.

Think about options

Your response should be tailored to the nature of the threat. Don’t expect people to gather information, to analyze the situation and to identify the best option in the wake of a threat. Understand the risk (use the chart to the left) and define actions that can be taken under various circumstances.

Some other ideas:

  • Set up a meeting with your local police to review and discuss your options.
  • There is no perfect solution. This is an issue that should be raised at a security committee or board meeting. Remember, your reputation is at stake and your decision may create liability issues.
  • Identify possible options leading to a sheltered evacuation, i.e., one that minimizes the dangers of an attack on evacuees:
  • Is your parking lot a relatively safe area? Could you evacuate there and stand an appropriate distance from your facility? Is there a sheltered path to an adjoining building? Can the local police establish a perimeter to protect the evacuees?
  • Develop appropriate protective measures based on your facility’s characteristics. For example, some facility managers have identified areas (e.g., a pool or gym) that are not cluttered and therefore, easy to check for bombs. If the architecture of the building is engineered so that the building would not likely collapse on those inside, one option is to evacuate people to these safe (or more accurately, safer) places (HT to Steve Levy of ISA).
  • Communicate, early and often. If you decide not to evacuate, some stakeholders will question your judgement and try to second-guess you. A well-planned sheltered evacuation option is easy to explain and to show that your highest priority is the safety of your stakeholders. Whatever you choose, have pre-written messages ready to go should you become a target.

No one can give you a perfect answer. Identify your options, consult with the best people possible and keep your people safe.

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Hoax threats can be scary, too.

January 09, 2017

Should we be worried? At this time the experts conclude that the series of incidents referencing threats against schools, Jewish facilities and businesses likely do not represent a credible terrorist threat for two reasons:

  1. terrorists’ rarely provide operational insight into their planning, and
  2. the fact that nearly all hoaxes in the United States are conducted by criminal actors or those instigating a nuisance prank.

Due to the common occurrence of bomb threats across the country over the last few years, the experts judge malicious terrorism hoaxes such as bogus emails and phoned-in threats, including robo-calls, will almost certainly continue, diverting resources as they create disturbances and send false alarms. However, don’t become blasé. Someone might take advantage of the hoaxes to accomplish a real attack.

What should we be doing? Consider these incidents to be a teaching moment. How would your organization handle such threats.

  1. Know what you should do. Have a bomb threat plan before an incident happens.  For starters, check out DHS’ Bomb Threat Guidance and Introduction to Bomb Threat Management. Add JCRC-NY’s post, Manhattan bomb threat: lessons learned to your reading list. Now is a good time to review, or to think through your own plans. Our own Emergency Planning: Disaster and Crisis Response Systems for Jewish Organizations has a longer chapter discussing the issue.
  2. Train your phone answerers. Everyone answering the phone (including those who might answer) should be taught how to handle a phone threat with this checklist. Have copies of the bomb threat checklist posted nearby.
  3. You have to communicate.
    • First things first. Call 911. Bring in the cavalry…ASAP. Whether you think the incident is real or a hoax, contact the experts and defer to them. Have a system (with primary and backup callers) that ensures that someone calls 911 immediately. Remember, don’t use a cell phone or walkie-talkie in the area of a suspicious package … you might set it off. Get to your landline.
    • Get the word out. Even if your people know what to do (i.e., you’ve conducted bomb scare drills) you have to let them know that they have to do it. Does your building have a public address system? Do you have cell phone numbers for all of your staff so that you can text them with updates? Can you modify your fire alarm system so that it sounds a distinctive signal for a bomb scare?
    • Let your constituencies know what’s happening. Bomb scares create angst and the possibility of physical danger, but there is the potential for risk to your reputation. No one wants a parent to learn about an incident from the media. Have pre-written messages ready for distribution directly to your constituencies (e.g., by text) stressing the steps you’ve taken and that everyone is safe. Have a point of assembly where worried parents can go for additional information from your best staffers. Work with the police to direct people to the appropriate areas. Do not post specifics on social media.  Click here for resources on crisis communication.
  4. Decisions, decisions. Have someone in charge (and a backup). OK, you receive a threat, now what? Certainly, dial 911, but should you evacuate or not (might someone use a bomb threat in order to trigger an evacuation setting up an active shooter or vehicle ramming?)? In reality there is no perfect answer to this question. Someone has to give the order and there will be no time to waste.
  5. Know where to go. If you decide to evacuate out of an abundance of caution you probably don’t want to stand in the street, especially if the weather is bad. Do you have an agreement with a neighboring institution that allows you to bring people into their facility. By doing so you can keep your people warm and dry and out of harms way.
  6. Keep unused parts of your building locked. It’s good practice to have your staff check your facilities daily, looking for something that “Just Doesn’t Look Right”. As they move through the rooms they should lock the doors. Closets and other storage areas should be kept locked. If you develop such procedures and do receive a bomb threat, the bomb sweep of your building can be accomplished faster.
  7. Consult your leadership about security plans. There will always be Monday morning quarterbacks, but a review of your plans at the Board level should empower those making difficult decisions under duress. As they say, “once is not enough.” Revisit security planning and procedures on a regular basis.

How can we know if the threat is real? The intelligence firm, Stratfor, recently published an article: How to distinguish a bomb threat from a bomb warning. The experts suggest some other possible indicators of a hoax:

  • Most genuine bombers wouldn’t specify the exact timing and target of an attack (since providing that information would jeopardize the success of an event);
  • Most genuine bombers wouldn’t use threats with complex scenarios involving chemical weapons or other advanced capabilities, or cite geographically dispersed targets; and
  • Most genuine bombers wouldn’t use threats involving large numbers of operatives.

Remember, there are no guarantees in security. You will have to weigh the options and make the best decisions possible. If you’ve thought about the options and have made decisions ahead of time, the odds of making the right decision increase dramatically.

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Awareness 101: When it “Just doesn’t look right”

December 23, 2016
Regularly check around your facility for anything that "Just doesn't look right"
Regularly check around your facility for anything that “Just doesn’t look right”. Shown is a car parked in a “No Parking” zone with strange wires.

Experts note that terrorist attacks don’t appear out of thin air. In virtually every situation (and that includes active shooter events) an attacker practices “pre-operational surveillance.” More mundanely, they “case the joint” or just show up to observe, orient themselves to the situation and to decide how they will act during their attack. When suspect behavior is reported (1-888-NYC-SAFE) it can be investigated and an attack can be interrupted.

Determining that it “Just doesn’t look right”

The NYPD Intelligence Bureau just released some excellent guidance. Its primary focus is to help detect suspicious signs along special event routes (e.g., parades) or areas designated for large-scale public gatherings (e.g., demonstrations, celebrations, street fairs, etc.), but can apply to houses of worship, schools, community centers and other gathering points. The following examples of activity, though not fully inclusive, may be of possible concern to law enforcement (Click here for a PDF of the NYPD Indicators of Terrorist Activity guidance):

  • The appearance of a suspicious vehicle (including bicycles with a storage basket; motorcycles; utility storage boxes, etc.) parked near the area designated for the event to take place. Items left for a protracted period of time and disregarded.
  • Actions by an individual that suggest the pre-event videotaping or still photography of the route or location (and surrounding area) for no apparent reason (i.e., no aesthetic value). Sketching of the area e.g., cross streets, access streets into and out of the area.
  • Any request to videotape from a roof or a vacant unit/apartment overlooking the event venue.
  • The sudden appearance of a new street vendor in an area adjacent to the event route, the venue’s access doors, or gathering location.
  • Unclaimed or suspicious packages/objects found along the special event route/location.
  • Individuals sitting or standing at a bus stop and not boarding a bus; Individuals sitting at a particular location (e.g., park bench) at the same time each day for numerous days.
  • The very. recent placement of a garbage can, postal mailbox, newspaper kiosk or other stationary object along the special event route/location.
  • Recent attempts by unknown individuals to gain access to your building’s roof overlooking the parade route/special event location/venue.
  • Inquiries about short-term rental of an apartment or space above your store/business – or in your residential complex — that also happens to offer a view of a parade route or special event location. (Terrorist operatives will often cohabitate to facilitate operational planning.Additionally, they may attempt to position themselves in an area that will ease their surveillance of potential targets.)
  • Large plastic drums being stored inside a building (commercial or residential space).
  • Reports of small fires or smoke conditions being reported from a particular store or apartment.
  • Suspicious inquiries by unknown individuals regarding:
    • The security measures anticipated for the event (e.g., extensive questioning as to
      the searching of backpacks, stopping of vehicles, etc.)
    • The seating of public officials, dignitaries, or other VIPs at an event.
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Attacks on Jews in the U.S. 1969-2016

December 12, 2016
From: Terrorist Incidents and Attacks Against Jews and Israelis in the United States, 1969-2016, Community Security Service
From: Terrorist Incidents and Attacks Against Jews and Israelis in the United States, 1969-2016, Community Security Service.

Take a look at the important new CSS publication, Terrorist Incidents and Attacks Against Jews and Israelis in the United States, 1969-2016, by our talented, good friend, Yehudit Barsky, with a forward by another friend, Mitchell D. Silber. The publication supplements the JCRC’s own Selective Threat Scan which was designed to assist Nonprofit Security Grant Program applicants complete the “Threat” and “Consequences” sections of the Investment Justification.

Here’s the Executive Summary of the document which aligns with JCRC’s ongoing advice:

It is vital that the American Jewish community, together with our law enforcement partners, learn the lessons of the past, understand the nature of the challenges arrayed against it, and take the proper precautions to ensure that violent acts against Jews and Jewish institutions can be prevented in the future.

  • Jewish targets often serve as precursors to larger attacks: Perpetrators of well-known larger attacks, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, were first involved in anti-Jewish incidents.
  • Awareness is critical: In many of these incidents, perpetrators conducted pre-operational surveillance. Training and engagement of community members to detect suspicious activity is thus essential.
  • A need to invest in community security infrastructure: The Jewish community can ill afford passivity and apathy against security threats. The community should broaden its understanding of what effective security entails, and invest in initiatives that provide tangible results. Foremost amongst these strategies is ensuring community members have the training and capacity to assist in securing their own communities, and partnering more closely with law enforcement agencies.

Unfortunately, much as we do not care to admit it to ourselves, the threats are real; there have been too many incidents to deny that. Now in the second decade of the twenty-first century, we find ourselves in an era where those who promote anti-Jewish rhetoric and instigation have the technical tools to reach a broader audience in less time than ever before. In fact, as recently as March 2016, the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) publicly encouraged its followers to attack Jews and their allies, “wherever they find them.”

It is vital that the American Jewish community, together with our law enforcement partners, learn the lessons of the past, understand the nature of the challenges arrayed against it, and take the proper precautions to ensure that violent acts against Jews and Jewish institutions can be prevented in the future.

Click here for the full report.

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Armed or unarmed security, what’s best?

December 07, 2016

The answer is, it depends. The question comes up at almost every one of our security training sessions. Honestly, there are both advantages and disadvantages of either option. Guns and Security: the Risks of Arming Security Officers in the December issue of Security Management (a publication of the security industry trade association, ASIS) discusses many of the issues that must be considered.

Each organization must carefully weigh the pluses and minuses themselves, as applied to their building, their constituencies and their culture. Since this decision could possibly affect your brand, your reputation and/or your liability, it is advisable to include your board of directors in the decision. If your organization is leaning towards armed security, we suggest four “best practices”:

  1. Hire any armed security guard on the basis of their experience, training and judgement rather than their weapon. If you hire e.g., an off-duty/retired law enforcement officer, you are hiring much more than their gun.
  2. Deploy armed guards as one element of a multi-layer security plan. If a determined intruder is targeting a specific institution, a solo guard (armed or not) may become the first, unfortunate target without any opportunity to even his/her weapon.
  3. Contract with an outside firm. Given the documented risks associated with armed guards (outlined in the Security Magazine article), consider contracting with an independent vendor and make sure that they are responsible for the supervision of armed guards, all aspects of the armed guard’s ongoing training and compliance with governmental training, licensing and other requirements.
  4. Discuss your decision with your insurer. Whether the armed guard is, or is not, your employee you may have some liability and/or named in any lawsuit. Make sure that your insurer knows about your decision and that your are appropriately and adequately covered. (n.b., Some institutions employ an outside security consultant to manage their employees. A discussion between the security consultant and the insurer may assuage the concerns raised by the insurer).

NYPD does have a Paid Detail Unit which provides officers to perform off-duty, uniformed security work within New York City for approximately $45/hour.  Click here for more information and contact details. Of course, the above recommendations still apply.

Quick tips: What should your guard(s) be doing?
no-potted-plantGuards should not be merely uniformed potted plants adorning your lobby. Rather, they should be an important and active component of your overall security plan.

If you have a single guard, his/her logical priority is access control (see our suggestions on how to develop an access control policy here). At the same time, don’t lose sight of other important functions, including:

  • Vigilance. While they are on duty they can observe what is going on outside your building and monitor CCTV, possibly leading to the early detection of hostile surveillance or imminent hostile acts. See our suggestions for detecting hostile surveillance here.
  • Walk-arounds. Remember the Chelsea bombs? They were hidden in a trash container and a suitcase. If someone planted a device in your garbage can would anyone find it? One best practice is to have your guard tour your facility, inside and out, looking for something that “Just doesn’t look right”.
  • Notifications.Your guard should be given defined protocol and procedures if something “Just doesn’t look right” : who to notify (e.g., senior staff, general alarm), how to act and what else to do.
  • Crisis management. A well trained guard should be able to follow the protocols and procedures defined by you. They should be able to support responses such as bomb threats, evacuations and/or sheltering-in-place.

The security management industry calls instructions for guards, “post orders” which clearly outline the duties, responsibilities, and expectations of security guards. For example, your post orders should clearly set forth your access control policies and define the areas of your property that should be included in a walk-around and their time and frequency (e.g., upon arrival and upon returning from lunch).

 

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High Holidays: Are you ready to get out if you have to?

September 26, 2016

It’s happened more than once…a fire in a synagogue during High Holiday services. Bomb threats and suspicious packages … you have a plan, but fires?

Most people  tend to exit through the door they entered. In an emergency, if people don’t use all of the doors there will be bottlenecks leading to injuries or worse. With a little bit of planning and rehearsal this problem can be readily mitigated.

  • We all have seen the “cards in the seat pockets in front of you” on a plane. Simply figure out how to divide your sanctuary spaces so that all of the exits will be used and create a chart like the one below (add some instructions), reproduce it and stick it in the pockets in front of the pews.
  • No one expects you to conduct a fire drill on Yom Kippur, but you can ask your ushers and key staff to attend a rehearsal meeting in advance of services. Discuss your plans and their roles with them ahead of time.
  • Pre-write directions that should be kept on the bimah. In the event of an emergency you shouldn’t count on people to call an “audible” (i.e., improvise).
(Click to link to a PDF of the sample)
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High Holiday security: stay vigilant

September 13, 2016
Bernard Picart [Public domain], The Sounding of the Shofar on Rosh Hashanah, illustration circa 1733–1739 by Bernard Picart from
Bernard Picart [Public domain], The Sounding of the Shofar on Rosh Hashanah, illustration circa 1733–1739 by Bernard Picart from “The Ceremonies and Religious Customs of the Various Nations of the Known World”
Security and emergency planning should be an integral component of every synagogue’s High Holiday preparations. Here are some tools to guide you:

High Holiday Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Library

Synagogue-specific Security & Emergency Planning

Consider the following elements of heightened vigilance:

  • Increase visible security measures. Someone planning an attack may look at your facility, conclude that it is defended and decide to go elsewhere. Several recent incidents also underscore that the presence of armed security and law enforcement personnel and the placement of security checkpoints do not guarantee that an attack will be averted or interupted. Nevertheless, their presence can enable the timely discovery and quick resolution of potential threats and reduce the lethality of terrorist attacks.
  • Review your policies and procedures. How else can you send a signal to outsiders that your facility is a tough target? For example, does your staff do regular inspections of your facility looking for something that, “Just doesn’t look right?” If not, start now. If they do, should you increase the frequency. Review JCRC’s Sample Access Policies and Procedures to identify additional steps.
  • Test your systems. OK, you’ve identified systems to screen your mail, respond to bomb threats and suspicious objects and you have an active shooters plan. The key question is: “Will they work in reality?” Do your panic buttons function? Test them (after you first alert the alarm company). Have you had tabletop exercises and drills covering multiple hazards? How can you make sure that your entire staff and constituencies are on their collective toes?
  • Check in with your local police. For most Jewish organizations, September is the start of a new program year. Reach out to your local police. Offer them the opportunity to get to know your programs, your rhythms, your people and your building. Ask them for suggestions as to how to make your people safer.
  • If you see something, say something. Think how to build a culture of security, because security is everbody’s business. If any of your staff, students, volunteers, congregants or clients sees or hears something suspicious they should feel comfortable to report it to the appropriate person in your facility and the information should be passed on to the police. In NYC the number is 1-888-NYC-SAFE. Elsewhere in New York State the number is 1-866-SAFE-NYS. Every tip is investigated.
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Lessons learned: Aventura, FL bomb plot

May 09, 2016

The FBI arrested James Gonzalo Medina (aka James Muhammad) on April 29, 2016 for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against persons or property within the United States. Click here for the “Lessons Learned”.

The allegations

Aventura-Turnberry Jewish Center
Aventura-Turnberry Jewish Center

According to a complaint filed with the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida at a hearing on May 2, 2016, Medina was arrested after he attempted to place what he believed to be an improvised explosive device (IED) at the Aventura Turnberry Jewish Center (a large Conservative synagogue) in Aventura, Florida. The device Medina attempted to place and remotely detonate was never operable due to FBI intervention.

Medina, according to the complaint, had stated his desire to conduct an attack, saying it was to “strike back to the Jews” because “It’s a war man and it’s like it’s time to strike back here in America.”

On March 27, 2016, Medina and two associates allegedly discussed an interest in conducting an attack on a synagogue. One of the associates subsequently relayed Medina’s intentions to die in a shooting at a synagogue in Aventura to the FBI. According to the complaint, on or about April 1, 2016, Medina confirmed his desire to conduct a weapons attack using AK-47 rifles and that, if he were to conduct an attack, he would want to do it at a synagogue. Medina further explained his desire to become a martyr in the attack. When Medina was told that there was a Jewish holiday in a few weeks, Medina responded by saying that it would be a good time to attack. He also allegedly discussed hiding a bomb in the bathroom.

The complaint alleged that Medina created a flyer that contained a photo of the ISIS flag and the words “ISIS in America;” and that he made three videos, saying, “I am a Muslim and I don’t like what is going on in this world…Aventura, watch your back. ISIS is in the house;” “Today is gonna be a day where Muslims attack America. I’m going to set a bomb in Aventura;” and one saying goodbye to his family.

On the day of his arrest, Medina allegedly took possession of what he believed to be an explosive device in a parking lot in Hallandale Beach, FL. He did not know that it was inert and of no danger to the public. He was arrested upon his arrival at the synagogue. Read More Lessons learned: Aventura, FL bomb plot

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JCRC: training here, training there

January 26, 2016

The past few months have been busy with JCRC-NY coordinating major  training sessions for hundreds of institutions in the NY area. There is a heightened awareness of the potential for attacks and a willingness on the part of organizations to “Step up their Game.”

All of the trainings focused on security/terrorism awareness, building a culture of security within organizations and active shooter responses. Kudos and thanks to our wonderful partners, including: NYPD Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. Our common goals are to strengthen the ties between law enforcement and nonprofit organizations and to empower them by giving them to tools and knowledge to respond as well as possible. Here’s some examples of our recent work: Read More JCRC: training here, training there

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Manhattan bomb threat: lessons learned

November 24, 2015
Bomb threat in Manhattan gets major NYPD response
Waiting for the “All-Clear” while a synagogue building is searched in a major response to a bomb threat in Manhattan. Photo: @ClarkPenaEH

Bomb threats are nothing new. Paris and Brussels have educated more Americans that terrorist attacks are a scary possibility, but the Jewish community has known that for a long time.

Dealing with a bomb threat is never easy, but in today’s environment, planning and cool heads are critical. Click here for a tool for bomb threat planning.

After the NYPD issued an all-clear, we spoke with Aaron Strum, Executive Director of The Jewish Center about his crazy day and “lessons learned”. This is what we learned:

  • Planning is where its at. Even the best organizations can make mistakes if they’re “just winging it”. If you receive a communication (phone, mail, email) what should you do first: evacuate or lockdown? Who’s going to call the police? Do you know what to tell them? Making those decisions during planning sessions is preferable to making them under pressure.
  • Secure-obp_dhs-doj-bomb-threat-guidance-imageGet everyone on the same page.  Often Jewish institutions house multiple organizations under the same roof. Every organization in the building should have the same plan, and there should be a single leader calling the shots. Everyone in the building should have the same training and participate in common exercises and drills.
  • Know who’s in charge…and who’s next. Ok, the call comes in, what’s the next step? Should you evacuate or shelter-in-place? There has to be a clear delineation of  command. At the same time, there have to be backups, with full authority to make decisions, in place.

We recently reviewed the emergency plans for a school that included the instruction, “If a threat is received, find Mr. Levine …” What if Mr. Levine is out of the building? The plan was silent. Should anyone call 911? The plan was silent. Everything stopped until Mr. Levine was found. Plans must be flexible and adaptable, rather than reliant on a single person.

  • When the cavalry comes over the hill, they’re in charge. OK, you have your plan and you like it. One element of your plan is to designate someone to be at the door to meet the first responders. Brief them about the details, but you’re probably going to have to repeat yourself when the next wave of police come (The UWS event had the precinct, Emergency Service Unit, Strategic Response Group and the Bomb Squad respond). Someone may overrule your plan. Assume that they know what they’re talking about.
  • You must be able to communicate.
    • Internally. That means PA systems, intercoms, walkie-talkies, texts, runners, whatever. Everyone in the building has to know what is happening so that they can execute their role in your plan.
    • Externally. Everyone will want to know what’s going on and you will be deluged by phone calls, texts, emails. Plan on that. Quick tips:
      • Forward your calls. Parents want to know that their kids are safe. Have the capacity to forward your calls from the main number to a cell phone or an alternate landline.
      • Mass notification system, phone trees, email groups or mass texting. There are many ways to do it, but people want to know something. There are services and software that can efficiently handle the problem using multiple channels (simultaneous email, landline and cell phone calls/texts) or you can set up your own system (e.g., free services like Google Hangouts or search for “group texting”). Bottom line: set something up ahead of time, draft sample messages and be ready.
      • Media nudnikim. Somehow, enterprising reporters will find you. Remember, your first responsibility is to your constituents, not the media. You don’t have to talk to them, at least until you have time to breathe. (See our  Disaster and Crisis Response Systems for Jewish Organizations, p. 171 ff)
  • Determine places of assembly. So, you’re evacuating and it’s 10° outside. Where should you go with your dozens or hundreds of students? Another school, a public place? In this case there was a synagogue building close by (which went into lockdown, at the advice of the NYPD), but don’t wing it. Find the best place and have a discussion with them ahead of time. Often, you can develop a mutual assistance agreement (See our  Disaster and Crisis Response Systems for Jewish Organizations, p. 111 ff). Also remember that you need dismissal/parental pickup plans that will work in the place of assembly.
  • Know your building. Before issuing an “all-clear” someone will have to search every place in your building that a bomb can be hidden.
    • Lock unused spaces. As a matter of course, keep unused spaces in your building and closets, elevator rooms, mechanical rooms, etc., locked. If spaces need not be searched the search will go quicker.
    • List hidden spaces. Every building has nooks and crannies hidden to most people, even to those using the building every day. Make  a list of those places, floor-by-floor. When the search for a device is underway, you don’t want them to miss anything.
  • Do a post-incident postmortem. Take the time to have the key players sit down to decide what went right and what went wrong. Then modify your plans accordingly.

 

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